Blog #6

I think the main thing that I learned from this class is the effects of PAST forces on a multi-engine aircraft when an engine fails.  I think that this topic is the main difference between flying a multi-engine airplane such as the Seminole and flying an archer or an arrow.  I think the second most important thing that I took away from this class is the need for more pre-flight planning and different safety factors to take into consideration when planning multi-engine flights, especially with passengers on board.  The one thing that I would change about the class is spacing/number of stage checks.  I don't think having three tests during midterm week was very beneficial although I know it was required by the jepp syllabus.  I think the most beneficial part of the class was talking about real scenarios.  I though analyzing the aspen accident was very beneficial as well as talking about different scenarios and doing weight and balances for bigger airplanes that we would actually fly when we get a job. As far as blogging goes I think it was beneficial because it forced me to reflect on the assignments and put my reflection into words.  The one blogging assignment that I did not think was very beneficial was the observation flight but that was mainly due to the fact that I had already done that flight and it was Sam's first flight. 

Flight Observation

For my observation flight I observed Sam Acosta and Mike Digrazzia on September 22 in N978WC.  This flight was Sam's first flight in the Seminole, although she had already tried to fly several times before but had to cancel due to reasons such as fuel being late and bad weather.  Although this was Sam's first lesson and I had already completed this lesson the observation flight was still helpful.  The first thing that I noticed about the Seminole and something that I do not get to experience very often is how small the back seat is.  When I go in the back seat I was not looking forward to the flight because I thought I would be sitting sideways the whole flight or jamming my knees into Sam or Mike's back the whole flight, but then Sam and Mike got in and I realized that I chose the right flight to observe because the first thing they did was move their seats all the way forward so they could reach the rudder pedals.  After that excitement was over Sam briefed the passengers, me, and started  both engines without any problems.  We did our run-up, which takes a little bit longer than the arrow and archer run ups, and headed out to Tooele.  I think one of the biggest benefits of observing this flight was that I was able to sit in the back seat with my check list and visualize my flows during each phase of flight, especially since I flew the Seminole right after Sam that day.  When we got out to Tooele we flew directly to the airport and Mike demonstrated how to land the Seminole.  After Mike demonstrated he gave the controls back to Sam and she did a very good job of landing it.  After practicing a few landings they flew to North Grantsville to demonstrate maneuvers.  Mike demonstrated stalls and then he demonstrated failing an engine.  As I said earlier the main benefit of this flight was being able to go through my checklist while Sam and Mike executed the maneuvers, such as when Mike demonstrated shutting down the engine.  After an hour out in Tooele Sam and Mike flew us back to Salt Lake and that pretty much ended the lesson.  Sam did a very good job of flying the Seminole for the first time and it was a good observation flight.

Aspin Arrival

I thought this accident really shows that no matter how experienced you are as a pilot you are still vulnerable to the same hazardous attitudes that you learn about while getting your private pilot.  The captain of this G III had over 9000 hours of total time and over 1500 hours of time in the G III and the first officer was very experienced as well.  Even though the flight crew was very experienced, they still felt the pressure of arriving on time to please the customer and were not able to identify and end the error chain that occurred during the flight which ultimately resulted in this accident.
The factors that contributed to this accident include pressure from the customer to get to the destination that night, even if it was illegal to do so, bad weather at the destination, pressure from a customer watching the approach from the jump-seat, the controllers lack of knowledge of an important NOTAM, as well as the nature and difficulty of the approach into Aspen. 
The error chain that eventually led to the outcome of this flight started while the airplane was still on the ground  and the passengers were not on board the airplane.  The first error occurred when the flight crew advised the "boss" of the potential of diverting to Rifle because of the noise abatement procedure.  The company should have stepped in at this point to explain  to the "boss" of the legal and safety reasons that they would not be landing at Aspen after dark and the captain should have established his authority making the decision to not land at Aspen after the curfew because of the regulation as well as the NOTAM.  The second error in the chain was at the beginning of the approach when the flight crew allowed a passenger to observe the approach even though they knew the weather was not good and other jet aircraft had been going missed.  Having the passenger observing could have effected a decision to aboart the approach because they might have had a macho attitude and wanted to avoid dissatisfaction of the passengers.  The third error is when ATC cleared the airplane for the approach even though it should never have been authorized because of the NOTAM.   The next event was deciding to shoot the approach visual even though previous planes had gone missed.  The fifth event was the inability of both pilots to agree if they were able to see the runway but still continuing on the approach.  After that last events include ignoring the altitude/sink-rate alerts and configuring the aircraft in an incorrect way that could have been the result in the 2000+ sink rate at the end of the approach.
During the course of the flight there were several things that the pilots should have done differently.  The first thing I think they should have done differently is with dealing with the irate passenger before the flight took off.  The pilots should have had the company talk to the passenger to explain the reasoning that they had the potential of diverting and tell him that they would not be landing in Aspen after dark.  During the approach phase the flight crew should not have allowed a passenger to observe the approach because of the high workload due to the difficulty of the approach and the weather involved.  The pilots should have shot the approach and not continued visually because they became spatially disoriented during the approach.  The pilots should have discontinued the approach when they could not agree that they had the runway in sight.  The final thing they should have done differently is to keep the aircraft in an approved configuration and not engage  the spoilers which caused the excessive sink rate.
If my job was on the line I would call the company and request that they resolve the issue with the unruly passenger.  If for some reason this did not work or was not an option I would determine conditions before the flight with my first officer stating specifically when we would discontinue or not even attempt the approach and divert to Rifle so we would not have to make that decision while en route or in the approach environment. A company would not fire you for not being willing to break a law.

Single Pilot IFR

As a pilot who is relatively new to flying IFR I would not attempt to fly single pilot IFR.  The author of the article makes the point that there are a lot of differences between flying IFR while under a hood and actually flying in IMC where you have the potential of flying to minimums on an approach and still being in the clouds.  As of now I do not have any experience in IMC conditions and would not feel comfortable flying single pilot IFR. 

I think one of the good tips that the author included in the article was the statement of "it is better to be competent in the essential equipment than confused and intimidated by sophisticated but poorly understood paraphernalia."  The author makes a very good point about the new trend in aviation, especially IFR flying, of having very advanced equipment in the cockpit that is supposed to make things easier on the pilot but often increases the workload because the pilot does not fully understand how to operate the equipment and focuses too much on it.  I have never flown the Cessna with the glass cockpit and I know if I was to try to fly IFR or even VFR I wouldn't even know where to start with it.  Even while flying VFR or IFR with a standard GPS it can distract you from flying the airplane and you can get into undesirable situations or very behind in an approach.

In-Flight Electrical Fires

The in-fight electrical fires safety brief helped me understand how to recognize the symptoms of in flight electrical fires as well as what to do and what not to do in the event of an electrical fire.  The article showed that there might be different procedures for dealing with electrical fires in different airplanes as well as different considerations for ways to handle electrical fires for different situations, such as flying VFR vs IFR.  One procedure this article really stressed was not to reset circuit breakers unless it is absolutely necessary.  Although i knew you should limit the number of times that you reset circuit breakers I thought it was a helpful that this article stressed that you should not reset a circuit breaker if you do not have to because of the dangers of that causing a fire or damaging electrical components.

A short circuit i an electrical circuit that allows current to travel along an unintended path.

Our procedure differs from the articles quick check list in that Westminster's procedures says immediately turn off the battery master, alternator, all electrical switches, radio master, and cabin heat instead of trying to talk to atc and identify the individual problem.

In the future I will  be aware of the symptoms of an electrical fire to try to avoid a big electrical fire that can be very dangerous. This article showed that events such as the GPS temporarily failing or multiple circuit breakers popping are symptoms and precursors to a big electrical fire and require immediate attention and recognition.  If I do experience an electrical fire then I will follow the appropriate checklist for the airplane to try to resolve the situation and minimize the damage.

First Blog

My expectations for this class is to learn about the systems of multi-engine aircraft and to be prepared to take my check ride by the end of this course.  I do not have any prior blogging experience.  I expect to learn from other students through blogging by reading their blogs to see different views of in class topics through out the course.